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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TALLINN 000573

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC: POSTS FOR
FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [KFRD](#) [CVIS](#) [CPAS](#) [CMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [EN](#)

SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TALLINN: THIRD QTR
FY2007

REF: A) STATE 083571; B) 05 STATE 205073

Answers keyed to reftel:

1A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: No change from previous
fraud summary.

1B. NIV FRAUD:

-- No significant changes from the previous fraud
summary. Post continues to verify suspicious
applicant-provided information using various online
resources, including but not limited to Lexis-
Nexis, which we are finding to be a valuable and
far-reaching tool to research applicant claims
regarding U.S. residents and businesses. Our
upload to CLASS last year of 7,505 "L" entries for
suspected overstays (based on DHS I-94 records)
continues to pay dividends, with several NIV
applicants confessing to previous overstays,
leading in some cases to 214(b) and/or 212(a)(9)
findings.

-- Many of our suspected overstay cases, along with
all cases with derogatory CLASS, CCD or local NIV
information, are identified before the applicant
even appears for an interview. Post uses a semi-
automated method of name-checking all applicants in
INK using information gleaned from our online
appointment system. Basically: The day before
applicants appear, our NIV Visa Assistant downloads
an Excel spreadsheet list of all the next day's
applicants from our online appointment system (a
Microsoft commercial product leased at \$29 per
month). She then runs an Excel macro that cleans
up the list (drops diacritics, etc.) and
reformats it as an INK-ready .csv file. She then
runs a batch namecheck on the file from INK. Next,
our Consular Associate reviews the results, pulling
any CAT files or CSD info on any serious/complex
cases so adjudicating officers have a leg up on the
case prior to interview time.

1C. IV FRAUD: Post began full IV and DV processing
for the first time in May 2007. Prior to the launch
all Consular section FSOs and FSNs visited IV-
processing posts (London, Helsinki, and Moscow)
prior to May 1 for training on all aspects of IV
processing included IV-related fraud, such as
marriage fraud. Post also sent two representatives
to the one-day fraud conference Stockholm on May 8.

1D. DV FRAUD: See above regarding IV fraud

¶E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: Post encountered one Amcit with a history of lost passports who claimed to have lost yet another in Tallinn. He did not, however, submit an application or a DS-62 report at the time, because, in his words, he "couldn't be bothered". The Amcit, a dual U.S.-Estonian national appears to be indigent and have a substance-abuse problem. Post noted the incident in ACS+ and will try now with our PLOTS access to make an appropriate lookout on the passport number.

¶F. ADOPTION: No change from previous fraud summary.

¶G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS FRAUD: Post has received a Visas 92 case in which the original asylee "petitioner" appears to have been granted U.S. asylum on the basis of wildly exaggerated or false claims of persecution in Estonia. Post will not, however attempt to "prove a negative."

¶H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: Post has approached the Interior Ministry on several occasions to obtain access to the GOE's list of excluded aliens, but has not yet been granted a copy. The list is the basis of the Ministry's online individual namecheck system which can be used to check if a given individual is registered as an excluded alien.

¶I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN:

Lost and Stolen Passports: In June Post marked the six-month anniversary of fully-automated operation of our LASP reporting system. The program began in

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April 2006 and became fully automated in December 2006. In the first six months of fully automated processing, our stand-alone "LASP2" PC logged onto the Estonian Migration Board's LASP list webpage 182 times (once every 24 hours). During those sessions it detected 2,611 new records of lost and stolen Estonian passports, which it then submitted to the CA Support Desk via email, in the form of 48 separate Excel spreadsheets. Fifteen of those files were sent on a Saturday or Sunday. The system is described also in Department's June 15 ALDAC on LASP reporting (Ref A).

¶J. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The consular section consists of two officers, one consular associate and two FSNs. The FSNs and consular associate assist with fraud prevention work as required. Both officers have completed PC541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers. The Visa Assistant has recently completed PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention. On May 8, Post sent two representatives to the one-day fraud conference in Stockholm.

PHILLIPS